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As we go through our daily routines, all but the Pollyannas among us see flaws in our existing world. We may try to avoid dwelling on 
them, but they are there, and they bother us, sometimes a lot. What is easy 
to miss, without the perspective of even recent history, is that the flaws 
are generally minor, even trivial, compared to the often appalling state of 
affairs that existed in the same space just decades ago. 
Within the memory of living persons, our world was one with no sys-
tem of food or drug safety, essentially no building or fire codes, woefully 
ineffective criminal law enforcement, no protection of the environment, 
the appalling treatment of some people based on race or other group char-
acteristic, rampant drunk driving, rampant domestic violence, rampant 
sexual assault, and a host of other conditions that we would now find 
intolerable.
What can seem almost bizarre to us is that people of not that long ago 
accepted this state of affairs as perhaps regrettable but tolerable. When we 
examine that not-too-distant past, we frequently end up scratching our 
heads wondering, “What were they thinking?” 
Of course, this has always been the way of progress. You can be sure 
that in our not-too-distant future, people will be scratching their heads 
wondering about us, “What were they thinking?” We may each have our 
pet theory on what their source of wonderment will be, but more likely 
than not, if history is any judge, most of us will guess wrong. Our suc-
cessors will find appalling and intolerable things that we as a society are 
presently quite willing to tolerate. 
Preface
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xii Preface
This process of the continuous march of progress—of increasing and 
shifting expectations and ever-rising baselines—is an interesting story in 
itself. One might think it is the natural result of hundreds or thousands 
of small steps of gradual improvement over time. And in some cases it 
is. But it turns out that the march of progress also has some sharp turns 
in it. The path of the march may be a long series of course corrections, 
but sometimes it is a quick turn or an unexpected lurch. Sometimes our 
present circumstances seem entirely acceptable—until they aren’t. Then, 
in a flash, we suddenly feel differently about things, and often just as sud-
denly do something about it. 
This book is about that fiery dynamic—changes that come quickly, 
sometimes suddenly, sometimes unpredictably, and sometimes inexpli-
cably. Our focus will be on a particular group of triggers of change that 
we think are the most interesting, the most powerful, and sometimes the 
most unexpected: crimes.
In the cases we explore, the general dynamic is the same: a terrible 
crime provokes public outrage that in turn produces important reforms. 
But there are many differences in how the dynamic works and what 
drives it. Why do some crimes trigger a turn from the current path while 
similar crimes only a year or two before did not? Or, why didn’t the turn 
wait until a similar crime several years or decades down the path? Or 
why a turn at all, rather than many gradual course corrections?
The exact nature of the crime-outrage-reform dynamic can take many 
forms, and we will explore those differences as we work through some of 
the most important cases of the past century. Each case is in some ways 
unique, but there are repeating patterns that can offer important insights 
about how change comes, and how in the future we might best manage it.
But what these extraordinary cases have in common is that all of them 
deal with crimes that changed our world.
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It is a pleasant early spring afternoon, and you are standing on the side-walk at 27 Washington Place in New York City. The building in front 
of you is a beautiful neo-Renaissance specimen ten stories tall. Situated 
on the corner of Green Street and Washington Place, on the New York 
University campus, hundreds of people use it every day in comfort and 
safety.
If you were standing at that same spot on the early spring afternoon of 
March 25, 1911, at 4:45 p.m., you would be dodging an onslaught of burn-
ing, screaming bodies, mostly of young women. The crowd in the street 
around is also screaming, but some of this is drowned out by the roar of 
the fire on the top three floors of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory. Young 
women are hanging out of the windows and standing on ledges trying to 
escape the flames. In many cases their dresses are already on fire.
Like watching a suicide jumper but times a hundred, you are help-
less to do anything. The flaming bundles are now falling in doubles and 
triples, all hitting the pavement with a sickening thud. When the rain of 
horror is over, 146 people are dead. Perhaps most striking about the hor-
rific event is that there is nothing terribly unusual about the factory on the 
upper floors. It is like hundreds of other factories in the city. 
The building’s façade looks the same today as it did one hundred years 
ago, but it is very different on the inside. Its safety and comfort is as typi-
cal of today’s buildings as the danger of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory 
was common in the factories of its day.
How did we get from there to here? In large measure, it was due to the 
horror of those falling flaming bodies.
Chapter One
1911 
Triangle Factory Fire
Building Safety Codes
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2 Chapter One
THE TRAGEDY
On the afternoon of March 25, 1911, as the sun sinks toward the west 
over the New York City skyline, a fire breaks out in the ten-story Asch 
Building. The top three floors of the building are occupied by six hun-
dred employees, mostly young women, of the Triangle Shirtwaist Com-
pany. True to its name, the company manufactures shirtwaists, a type 
of women’s blouse or dress with details similar to those in men’s shirts. 
It is about fifteen minutes before the five o’clock closing time. Someone 
drops a still-burning cigarette into a wood box under one of the cutting 
tables on the eighth floor. The box is filled with cloth cuttings that ignite. 
Workers at the cutting tables run to get buckets of water to extinguish the 
fire. The company has some twenty-seven buckets of water distributed 
throughout the thirty thousand square feet of its three floors. Before they 
can extinguish the flames, the fabrics hanging on a wire above the cutting 
tables catch fire.1
The factory is perfectly designed to fuel a massive fire. The floors, ta-
bles, and chairs are all made of wood. Cotton cloth in bolts, half-finished 
garments, and piles of scraps are everywhere. The sewing machines drip 
oil that coagulates on the factory floor; flammable fabrics and templates 
are everywhere. The factory is practically built to burn, and it does. The 
fire is quickly out of control, far beyond the reach of a few buckets of 
water.
In theory, there are several routes of escape: two staircases, a fire es-
cape, and two elevators. But the reality is different. One of the stairwells 
is locked. Management locks the door to prevent employees from tak-
ing breaks without permission or stealing company property. The other 
stairway is unlocked but narrow. At less than three feet wide, there is 
only enough room for a single-file procession. The fire escape is even nar-
rower. It descends to the second floor above a small courtyard that serves 
primarily as an air and light shaft. The two service elevators carry only 
ten people each.
A bookkeeper on the eighth floor calls the tenth floor and tells them 
about the fire. The tenth floor is occupied by the company’s management 
and owners. There are only sixty employees on the tenth floor, and they 
are able to evacuate onto the roof where a New York University professor 
and some students from the next building help them get away from the 
burning Asch building. The same bookkeeper tries to call the ninth floor 
but no one answers. Workers on that floor don’t realize there is a fire until 
they see smoke billowing up past their windows.
Rebecca Feibish, a seventeen-year-old émigré from Romania three 
years before, is at work on the ninth floor. She is the third of seven chil-
dren, and her annual salary of $300 is the highest in the family. When she 
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realizes the danger, she grabs her friend, Sylvia Riegler, and the two try 
to find a way out. Sylvia is not able to master her terror, but Rebecca pulls 
her forward, pleading with her to make the effort. 
There are some 275 people on the eighth floor and another 300 on the 
ninth. Those on the eighth floor have already jammed the escape routes 
before those on the ninth even know of the danger. A hundred or so 
people escape via the unlocked staircase but the well-fueled fire fills the 
stairwell with smoke. Some workers descend the narrow fire escape, but 
a large metal shutter blocks their way at the eighth floor landing. The des-
perate employees try to climb around the shutter, but the going is slow, 
and soon a crowd jams the stairs behind it. The fire escape sags under the 
weight, then falls away from the buildings, sending bodies, some aflame, 
tumbling into the courtyard below. 
The elevator operators are trying to do their best to ferry as many 
people as possible out of the building but they can only do so much. Soon 
the elevators fail. Gaspar Mortillalo, one of the operators, can’t force his 
elevator past the seventh floor to reach the fire because heat has warped 
the elevator tracks. As the elevator descends, Mortillalo hears the thud of 
bodies landing on its roof. As fire continues to consume the building and 
the heat becomes unbearable, agonized workers slide down the elevator 
cables. Some jump down the elevator shafts. Joseph Zito, the other eleva-
tor operator, can no longer get his elevator to ascend due to the accumu-
lated weight of bodies on top of it. 
The factory becomes a veritable furnace. The heat hits one thousand 
degrees as the fire reaches out with its tentacles, enveloping the build-
ing and grabbing at the clothes and hair of the hapless factory workers. 
People are forced out the windows by the flames. They fall or jump, many 
with clothes afire, down to the street below. Rebecca jumps. The teenager 
survives the fall but the doctors are unable to save her, and she dies at the 
hospital. Sylvia, too fearful of heights to stand in the window, heads back 
into the burning factory.
James P. Meehan of Traffic Division B is riding his horse through Wash-
ington Square Park that afternoon. He gets into a conversation with his 
superior, Lieutenant William Egan. A boy runs up to the pair gesturing 
wildly in the direction of the Asch building. Meehan rides toward the 
building, halting his horse in front of 23 Washington Place. Smoke is is-
suing thickly from the eighth floor. A bystander tells the policeman that 
he saw something looking “like a bale of dark dress goods” fall out of the 
window. “Someone’s in there all right. He’s trying to save the best cloth,”2 
the man says. 
Another cloth bundle falls from an open window. A gust of wind 
catches the bundle and it bursts open. It is not a bundle of cloth at all, but 
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4 Chapter One
the falling body of a girl whose dress is on fire. More people come run-
ning, summoned by the screaming onlookers. One man, John H. Mooney, 
runs to Fire Box 289 at the corner of Greene Street and raises the first 
alarm at 4:45 p.m.
Patrolman Meehan runs into the building and bounds up the stairs two 
at a time. He meets a mass of scared girls coming down, and he squeezes 
himself against the wall so they can pass. Moving further up, he trips on 
an unconscious girl between the seventh and eighth floors. He revives her 
and sends her down the stairs. By the time he gets to the eighth floor, he 
sees that the fire is only a few feet away from the door to the stairwell. 
He directs several more girls down the stairs with the help of a machinist 
named Louis Brown. Brown has worked his way to the front of a pack of 
girls and is able to force a door open. Sylvia had found her way to that 
area and is right behind Brown as it opens. Brown, Meehan, Sylvia, and 
the girls rushing out behind them are able to make it down the stairs.3
As they descend, Meehan hears banging coming from the other side of 
the sixth floor door. Giving it everything he has, he shoulders the door 
and it springs open. The floor is filled with terrified women. The employ-
ees who took the fire escape down from above discover that it is not a 
path to safety. They reenter the building at the sixth floor and eventually 
fight their way down to the street. By this time, fire engines and police 
vehicles are arriving. One witness, a coroner named Dr. D. C. Winterbot-
tom runs to a store and grabs a telephone. He freezes for a moment before 
he can collect himself enough to scream at the operator: “For God’s sake, 
send ambulances.”4
As medical personnel arrive on the scene, they stare in horror at the 
ghastly scene. Dozens of women are hanging from ledges. Some, their 
dresses ablaze, jump out of windows. The sounds of fire whistles and 
bells resound through the streets. Men on the streets yell up to the women 
not to jump. Wildly waving their arms, they yell “Here they come!” refer-
ring to the emergency personnel. Some men bring over blankets to catch 
the falling women. The bodies land on the blankets with such force that 
they rip the cloth out of the hands of the would-be saviors. They fall with 
tremendous force, crashing onto the sidewalk with sickening momentum. 
Where there are iron grates in the sidewalk, the bodies hit with such force 
that they smash through the grates. People are jumping in ones, twos, and 
threes, falling, and then crashing with the bone-crushing thumps. 
Bodies begin to pile up on the sidewalk. Some are on fire, and firefight-
ers douse them with their hoses. The water runs red with the blood. The 
bodies soon bury the fire hoses, forcing the firefighters to clear the bodies 
out of the way before they can continue to fight the fire.
Firefighter Captain Howard Ruch tells his men to open up life nets to 
catch the people who keep jumping as the fire pushes more and more 
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workers out of the windows and off the ledges. The men unfurl the nets 
and loop their arms in. The first net is ready just in time to catch three fall-
ing bodies. The bodies hit with eleven thousand pounds of force, and the 
firemen are knocked off their feet, and some tumble into the net. The nets 
rip and some start burning. People are now jumping in threes and fours. 
The nets are useless. Even the smallest bodies go right through. One 
woman survives the jump and Chief Edward J. Worth sends her across 
the street. She walks ten feet before collapsing, dead. The firemen try to 
raise ladders, but the ladders don’t reach past the sixth floor. One worker 
tries to grab at a ladder as she falls past it, but she misses and plummets 
downward, her clothes ablaze. 
A girl walks out on a ledge, moving away from the window. She takes 
off her wide-brimmed hat and throws it out, away from the building. 
She then takes some coins and bills from her handbag and casts them out 
over the street. The coins bounce on the cobblestones, and she plunges 
after them. A young man on the ninth floor holds a girl out of the win-
dow away from the heat and drops her. He takes another girl in his arms 
and drops her, too. Then he takes a third, as if, to quote reporter William 
Figure 1.1.  Bodies of victims collect on the sidewalk, 1911. Kheel Center, Cornell 
University, photo by: Brown Brothers
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6 Chapter One
Shepherd, he was helping her “into a street car instead of into eternity.” 
The man sees “that a terrible death awaited them in the flames and his 
was only a terrible chivalry.”5 The man takes one more girl in his arms 
and she puts her arms around him and they kiss. The man drops his lover 
and then casts himself out over the piles of the dead below.
On the Washington Place side, people are jumping feet first from 
the open windows. On the Greene Street side, people are stuck inside, 
crushed up against closed windows. The windows finally break, and 
from the empty frames, a torrent of fiery bodies pours out in a stream 
plummeting to the street.
At 4:57, no more than twenty minutes after the fire started, the last 
body, a young girl wreathed in burning clothes, jumps from a ledge on 
the ninth floor. She catches on an iron hook sticking out at the sixth floor 
and hangs there, burning, before something gives, and she falls to the 
sidewalk.
The number of dead is 146, mostly women, many of them very young.
THE OUTRAGE
Why is the Triangle Waistcoat Factory in a condition that allows this 
monstrous disaster? Owned by Joseph J. Asch, the structure was built in 
1901 at the cost of $400,000. The building is 135 feet tall. Were it fifteen 
feet taller, the law would require metal trim around the door and window 
frames as well as stone or concrete floors, all of which would provide 
greater structural support in a fire, but at 135 feet, its entirely wood con-
struction is legal. The building has ten thousand square feet on each floor, 
which, according to the law, requires three stairwells for exit. But the law 
seems to be applied in this instance according to personal interpretation. 
The architect successfully argued that “the staircases are remote from 
each other and, as there is a fire escape in the court[yard], it practically 
makes three staircases, which in my opinion is sufficient.”6
The Asch building’s “third staircase,” the fire escape, runs from the 
top floor and stops at the second story, leaving a one-story gap, but as 
Manhattan borough president George McAneny puts it, the law “leaves 
enormous discretionary power with the Building Department.” An expert 
in fire insurance and prevention, Arthur E. McFarlane, points out during 
the investigation that a lot of builders “decided to build their loft build-
ings without any fire escapes at all. Others put them in the air shaft which, 
in case of fire, becomes its natural flue. Others bolted on all-but-vertical 
18-inch ladder escapes such as could not legally have been placed upon 
even a three-story tenement house.” (The law for commercial buildings 
like Asch is different from the law for residential buildings.)
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State law dictates that doors in factories “shall be so constructed as to 
open outwardly, where practicable, and shall not be locked, bolted or fas-
tened during working hours.” In the Asch building, the stair landings are 
too narrow to allow the doors to open outward. Thus, outward-opening 
doors are judged not “practicable.” The dangers of inward-opening doors 
have been established by earlier fires where people pushing to exit from 
a fire make it impossible for the doors to open inward. Panic bars, devel-
oped in response to the problem, were commercially available in 1911, but 
not legally required.
In 1911, New York City doesn’t have laws mandating fire sprinklers 
in factories. It is not that the value of such systems is doubted. Fire Chief 
Edward F. Crocker notes that there has never been a death in a building 
with a sprinkler system. It is simply that it is up to the person who must 
pay for the devices to decide to install them. Additionally, fire equipment 
of the day can’t combat fires higher than eighty-five feet up. That means 
that the top three floors of the Asch building, the entirety of the Triangle 
Factory, is out of reach of the fire hoses. 
Chief Crocker has previously testified before the New York State As-
sembly to these building safety failings: “I think if you want to go into 
the so-called workshops . . . twelve, fourteen or fifteen story buildings 
they call workshops, you will find it very interesting to see the number of 
people in one of these buildings with absolutely not one fire protection, 
without any means of escape in case of fire.”7 
Even cheap fixes, such as fire drills, are not mandated. P. J. McKeon, 
a fire prevention expert who lectures at Columbia University, inspects 
the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory in 1909. The factory owners are trying to 
increase their insurance coverage. McKeon is worried about the crowded 
top three floors of the building. Upon learning that the building has never 
had a fire drill so workers will know how to respond to a fire, McKeon 
recommends such a drill, but no drill is organized.
On October 15, 1910, just months before the deadly fire, fireman Ed-
ward F. O’Connor inspects the Asch building. Based on the then-current 
building codes, he reports that the fire escape and stairways are “good.” 
Further, the building, a veritable matchbox, is legally considered “fire-
proof.” So, after the tragedy, Joseph Asch is able to accurately tell report-
ers “I have obeyed the law to the letter. There was not one detail of the 
construction of my building that was not submitted to the Building and 
Fire Departments. Every detail was approved and the Fire Marshall con-
gratulated me.” After the fire, Albert G. Ludwig, the chief inspector and 
deputy superintendent of the Building Department says that the Asch 
building “could be worse and [still] come within the requirements of the 
law.”8
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The rain of burning women is not quickly forgotten. The Collegiate Equal 
Suffrage League holds a rally at Cooper Union on the Friday after the 
fire.9 A banner across the speakers’ platform reads, “Votes for women. 
Locked doors, over-crowding, inadequate fire escapes. The women could 
not, the voters did not alter these conditions. We demand for all women 
the right to protect themselves.”10 The event’s program includes a speech 
from Dr. Anna Shaw, a well-known suffragist.
“As I read the terrible story of the fire,” Dr. Shaw says to the emotion-
ally raw crowd, “I asked, ‘am I my sister’s keeper?’ For the Lord said to 
me, ‘where is thy sister?’ And I bowed my head and said, ‘I am respon-
sible.’ Yes, every man and woman in this city is responsible. Don’t try and 
lay it on someone else. . . . You men—forget not that you are responsible! 
As voters it was your business and you should have made it your busi-
ness.” (Women did not get the vote until nine years later, in 1920.)
Dr. Shaw faults the law: “Something’s got to be done to the law,” she 
argues to applause. “And if it’s not constitutional to protect the lives of 
workers then we’ve got to smash the constitution! It’s our ‘instrument,’ 
and if it doesn’t work, we’ve got to get a new one!”11 The crowd learns 
that over fifty thousand workers die every year in work accidents, around 
a thousand a week. As for the owners of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, 
“Mr. Harris and Mr. Blanck were there at the time the fire broke out. They 
escaped. We congratulate them. My friends, what a tremendous differ-
ence between the captains of ships and the captains of industry!”12 
Chief Crocker, the perpetual critic of weak fire safety codes, sends a 
note that is read to the assembly. Crocker wants the crowd to understand 
that choices are being made. These deaths are not the wrath of God or 
an accident: “It comes down to dollars and cents against human lives no 
matter how you look at it.”13 
The National Women’s Trade Union League holds a similar rally in 
the Metropolitan Opera House on April 2, 1911. They attempt to channel 
the outrage into creating safer conditions for factory workers. The Inter-
national Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) organizes a funeral 
procession to mourn the women who died in the fire.14 
A commemorative funeral march of over one hundred twenty thou-
sand people is held on April 5, a Wednesday. It is a frigid, rainy morning 
eleven days after the fire. The city essentially shuts down for the event. 
Three hundred thousand people line the route, paying tribute as empty 
coffins roll by. The funeral parade takes four hours to pass by. With the 
dead duly honored, the raw emotion of the public becomes focused on the 
perceived negligence of the owners, Max Blanck and Isaac Harris.
Two weeks after the fire, the owners are charged with first and second 
degree manslaughter for locking the doors that prevented the workers 
from escaping. They are indicted and brought to trial. The prosecutors 
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must prove that Harris and Blanck either locked the doors or ordered 
them to be locked. Their defense is easy, simply noting that they took no 
such action and had no knowledge of it being done. On December 27, 
they are judged not guilty. Angry crowds yell “Murderers!” as they leave 
the courthouse.15
Several survivors and dozens of family members of those who died 
bring civil cases against Harris and Blanck. Most families cannot afford 
the legal fees required to bring a civil suit. There is no such thing as Work-
ers’ Compensation in 1911, but the owners eventually settle, agreeing 
to give the twenty-three litigants seventy-five dollars per victim or the 
equivalent of five weeks’ wages. 
Under existing law, the owners have not done anything so bad or so 
different from what others do to be singled out for criminal punishment. 
Nor are any officials found to have done wrong. The law’s expectations 
for building safety are low. Chief Crocker seethes. He testifies: “The 
fault in New York City is that there is nobody responsible for anything. 
The Fire Department is not responsible; the Building Department is not 
responsible; the Police Department is not responsible; the Health Depart-
ment is not responsible. If anything happens they are all stepping from 
under.”16 
THE REFORM
On the day of the fire, Frances Perkins is having tea with friends just 
down the street from the Asch Building. The group hears the fire engines 
and goes into the street to investigate. Perkins, a Mount Holyoke gradu-
ate, watches, helpless to prevent the deaths. 
Perkins is the executive secretary of the New York Consumers League. 
Her work in economics and social work combines with her deep personal 
convictions to make her an effective lobbyist. She has long had a vision of 
doing “something about unnecessary hazards to life.”17 Summoning her 
considerable talents, Perkins quickly starts the process for reform. 
She taps into the public outrage of the moment and calls on politicians 
generally and Governor John Dix in particular to act. Recounting her eye-
witness memories of the fire, she reminds everyone, “I can’t begin to tell 
you how disturbed the people were everywhere. It was as though we had 
all done something wrong. It shouldn’t have been. We were sorry. Mea 
culpa! Mea culpa! We didn’t want it that way. We hadn’t intended to have 
147 girls and boys killed in a factory. It was a terrible thing for the people 
of the City of New York and the State of New York to face.”18 
Governor Dix, who understands the real source of power in New York, 
suggests that Perkins consult Tammany Hall—the Democratic machine 
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that controls New York City at the time—and its powerful bosses, Assem-
blyman Alfred Smith and Senate Majority Leader Robert F. Wagner. The 
powers of Tammany Hall decide that, given the continuing unrest, they 
will support legislation that promotes worker safety. On June 30, 1911, an 
appropriation is made to establish the Factory Investigating Commission 
(FIC), and the first state-sponsored investigation into worker safety is 
underway. Perkins is appointed executive secretary to lead the commis-
sion’s work.
Perkins uses the momentum of growing public discontent to obtain 
funding to study more than just the safety of garment shops in Manhat-
tan. The FIC examines firsthand the working conditions and safety of 
1,836 factories across the state, interviewing hundreds of civic and union 
leaders, factory workers, and public officials over four years. 
The commission does not lose sight of the headline event, the source 
of the outrage that created it, and its primary focus remains fire hazards. 
Ex-Chief Crooker, the longtime critic of existing regulations, testifies 
alongside many other experts regarding the inadequate codes and the 
impossibly confusing overlapping mandates across different city depart-
ments and agencies. Armed with these frontline reports, the FIC is able to 
get fifteen separate reforms enacted at the state level. 
The New York City Board of Alderman also uses the FIC report to jus-
tify creation of the Bureau of Fire Prevention. The city enacts the Sullivan-
Hoey Fire Prevention law, which clarifies the responsibilities of the dif-
ferent city agencies with respect to code promulgation, inspections, and 
enforcement. The city’s Municipal Building Code becomes more safety 
oriented: sprinkler systems must now be installed in all factories, as well 
as lighted exit signs, exit doors that open outward, and onsite fire-fighting 
equipment. Systemic issues are also addressed, including the problems 
of evacuating large groups from high-rises and the storage of flammable 
materials in public buildings.
New York State follows New York City’s lead. Over several rounds of 
legislation, laws are put into place that reorganize the New York State 
Department of Labor and assign broad powers to the department. A new 
industrial board is empowered to promulgate an industrial code that will 
carry the force of law. 
In turn, New York’s unprecedented response to the Triangle Shirtwaist 
Factory fire prompts many states to enact similar reforms.
On paper, the situation in New York City improves greatly. The Tam-
many bosses Wagner and Smith (the latter will soon become governor) 
work with Perkins in part because they want to change the image of their 
political machine and are seeking a broader political base. However, they 
still need the support of business owners. The cost of implementing the 
reforms would fall on owners, and sprinkler systems, fire extinguishers, 
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and redesigned egress do not come cheap. The ultimate solution to their 
dilemma: strong laws but weak enforcement.
Violations of the new codes frequently are not taken seriously. In 1913, 
Blanck and Harris, the owners of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, are run-
ning a new factory where the doors are again being chained, trapping 150 
women inside without means of escape in case of fire. The result: Blanck 
is fined twenty-five dollars. He understands the game. Later that same 
year, on December 23, Blanck is again found to be violating the law and 
is issued a warning. On this occasion he is not fined.
Nationally the movement brings real change to fire prevention and 
public safety. New York is the nation’s leader in passing fire-safety legis-
lation. Even though its own enforcement is weak, its legislative action sets 
an example to inspire others, whose enforcement is not so weak.
Tammany boss Wagner continues with his worker-safety reform move-
ment when he becomes a U.S. senator. Frances Perkins also becomes a 
national power, as secretary of labor under President Franklin Roosevelt, 
and adds an informed voice to the federal efforts toward fire safety. As the 
state and federal reforms take shape, Perkins reflects on the efforts, noting 
that they are “based really upon the experience that we had in New York 
State and upon the sacrifice of those who, we faithfully remember with 
affection and respect, died in that terrible fire on March 25, 1911.”19
BEYOND REFORM
While the Triangle fire is effective in starting the reform movement for 
building safety and spreading it beyond New York, the movement re-
mains primarily reactive.20 Each forward step requires a new tragedy. 
There is still no proactive search for codes that will avoid tragedies before 
they happen. 
In March of 1937, a natural gas explosion at the New London School 
kills 298 people in Texas. Most of the victims are children. Natural gas is 
not commonly used as a commercial heating fuel at the time, but waste 
gas from a nearby oil field is piped into the school building to heat it at 
essentially no cost. Natural gas is colorless and odorless, so when a leak 
occurs in the school’s system, no one notices. A shop teacher turns on 
an electric sander, providing the spark, and sets off the explosion. The 
building seems to lift into the air, then smashes to the ground, its walls 
collapsing. Its roof falls in, burying its victims under brick, steel, and con-
crete. A two-ton concrete slab flies two hundred feet from the building 
before landing on and crushing a 1936 Chevrolet. The explosion is heard 
four miles away.21 Once the cause of the fire is understood, Texas passes 
legislation requiring that odorous mercaptans be added to natural gas. By 
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giving natural gas a distinct odor, similar to garlic or rotten eggs, danger-
ous leaks become easier to detect. The reform quickly spreads.22
In 1942, a fire at the Cocoanut Grove nightclub kills 492 people. The 
firefighters have difficulty getting into the building because the doors, 
which open inward, are blocked by stacks of bodies. Further, the exits 
are too narrow to manage the volume of fleeing patrons, and decora-
tive draperies cover the exit signs. The club also has highly flammable 
finishes.23 Within a few years, commercially viable flame retardants for 
fabrics are developed. Interior finishes of buildings become regulated. 
The flammability of fabrics in other contexts is not immediately consid-
ered, however. Yet, all over the country children are regularly injured by 
seemingly benign sources. Items such as costume cowboy chaps quickly 
melt and burn the child if exposed to even moderate heat, yet are legally 
sold. After many children are injured, the federal government enacts the 
Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953, forbidding the use of dangerously flam-
mable textiles in making clothes. Consumer Product Safety Commission 
tests impose flammability standards for all clothing.24 The Children’s 
Sleepwear Standard of 1972 goes on to subject children’s sleepwear to 
special regulation.25
On December 7, 1946, a fire breaks out in the Winecoff Hotel in Atlanta, 
Georgia, killing 119 people. It remains the worst hotel fire in United States 
history. After the deaths, changes are made to building codes for hotels. 
The changes apply the same rules already mandated in many other types 
of buildings, such as requiring fire-retardant finishes, multiple exit stair-
ways, and fire doors to seal off stairwells.
In 1958, ninety-two school children and three nuns die when their 
school, Our Lady of Angels, burns. The building was not built to be a 
school and thus not legally bound to meet school building codes. While 
the school is clean and well run, a pile of cardboard somehow ignites and 
goes unnoticed. The school has a fire-safe brick exterior but the interior 
is made almost entirely of combustible wooden materials—stairs, walls, 
floors, doors, roof, and cellulose fiber ceiling tiles. Moreover, the floors 
have been repeatedly coated with flammable varnish and petroleum-
based waxes. There are only two (unmarked) fire alarms in the school. 
The four fire extinguishers are mounted seven feet in the air and thus 
unreachable to many. The only fire escape is beyond reach because the 
well-fueled fire quickly fills the hallway with suffocating smoke and su-
perheated gases.
Sweeping changes in school fire-safety regulations are thereafter en-
acted, including fire-safety doors at stairwells to slow the spread of a fire. 
Some 16,500 older school buildings in the United States are brought up 
to meet the new codes within one year after the disaster. The head of the 
National Fire Protection Agency gives voice to the larger issue: “There are 
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no new lessons to be learned from this fire; only old lessons that tragically 
went unheeded.” 
As awareness of fire danger grows, new problems are exposed. In the 
1970s, a new gadget makes its way into most American kitchens, drip 
coffeemakers. They are wonders of convenience; set it up and coffee is 
made and kept warm all day. By the mid-1980s, tracking the causes of 
fires becomes common, and the numbers reveal a grim story: hundreds 
of fires are being caused by the innocent-looking coffee devices. In 1996 
alone, five hundred residential fires are started by the machines.26 An 
inexpensive thermo-coupler, which is known to fail with regularity, is 
found to be the problem. Mr. Coffee, pitched by baseball hero Joe DiMag-
gio, is the most famous brand of drip coffeemakers and has many recalls 
of its machines. But in fact, almost all brands are fire hazards.
Regulating consumer goods to prevent fire hazards soon becomes com-
mon. Appliances are now tested and must meet safety standards before 
reaching retail shelves. The cost is passed on to the consumer, often at 
pennies per item.
Building safety, on the other hand, remains a maze of problems with 
no easy fix. Throughout the United States, model building codes are de-
veloped by a wide range of organizations, including local government of-
ficials, insurance underwriters, private groups, union organizations, and 
the federal government, without much thought to uniformity or guiding 
principles. The United States has no national building code. Rather, state, 
tribal, or local governments are left to decide for themselves what to do 
or not to do.27
To make it easier for governments to formulate reasonable practices, 
in 1994, the overarching International Code Council (ICC) is formed to 
coordinate comprehensive codes for building construction safety and fire 
prevention. The ICC is an umbrella organization comprising a family of 
international codes including the International Residential Code (IRC), 
the International Building Code (IBC), and the International Existing 
Building Code (IEBC). In the United States, each state and many munici-
palities still decide for themselves which specific codes they will adopt, 
but the model codes provide at least a nudge toward greater uniformity. 
The “Eurocode,” in contrast, is now in force in the entire EU, supersed-
ing all national codes. The model codes are constantly being improved. 
Today, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and every United States 
territory have adopted some ICC codes. 
The fire-safety reforms sparked by the Triangle Factory fire have in-
deed changed our world. At the time of the 1911 fire, workers died at a 
rate of about 1,000 per week in the United States, while the nation’s popu-
lation stood at 94 million. One hundred years later, the U.S. population is 
322 million, yet the weekly on-the-job death toll is down to 90, less than a 
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tenth of what it was, even though the population is now more than three 
times larger.28 The numbers are compelling: the odds of dying on the job 
in 1911 were 1 in 1,800; the odds that a given worker will be killed this 
year are 1 in 69,000. As a point of comparison, it is more likely that today’s 
worker will be killed crossing the street, a chance of 1 in 54,538.29
A LARGER PERSPECTIVE
What does the Triangle fire and its aftermath tell us about the tragedy-
outrage-reform dynamic? Why did the Triangle fire have the effect that it 
did? Why was it the trigger for reform rather than one of the many other 
earlier fires, some of which were even larger disasters?
The 1903 Iroquois Theater fire killed more people, 602. And it was 
equally horrendous. Families were at the theater for a holiday show. 
The stage curtains caught fire, which spread instantly to the ceiling and 
quickly engulfed the entire building. With the flames racing through the 
building, people panicked. Women and children screamed as the liv-
ing tried to climb over those trampled to death at the exits. The piles of 
corpses reached seven feet high and became walls that penned in the liv-
ing. By the time firefighters arrived, no one remained alive.
One might speculate that, while the theater fire was horrific, the horror 
was private. We could only imagine after the fact the terrible sufferings 
but only after officials later reconstructed the events that must have oc-
curred. The Triangle Factory fire, in contrast, was public. Nothing can 
match the riveting effect of raining flaming bodies, where it is the by-
standers on the sidewalk who are doing the screaming.
But this is a cheap answer, we think. More likely, it was the social and 
political environment that changed between the 1903 theater fire and the 
1911 factory fire. The real cause for the change lay with Theodore Roos-
evelt, an aggravated Tammany Hall, and a presidential assassin.
The political bosses of New York found the energetic, young Governor 
Roosevelt a troublesome man. His commitment to ridding the state of cor-
ruption and his desire to improve the lives of average citizens interfered 
with the Tammany Hall way of doing business. To get rid of Roosevelt, 
they promoted him to obscurity—he became vice president under Wil-
liam McKinley. But the plan went awry when McKinley was assassinated 
and Roosevelt, at forty-two, became the youngest president this country 
has ever had. 
With him, Roosevelt brought to power the Progressives, who had 
previously been a more intellectual movement than political one. His 
“Square Deal” promised the average citizen a government of fairness, 
which would break the trusts, regulate the railroads, and provide pure 
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food and drugs. The goal of building safety fell squarely within the nature 
of the Progressive agenda.
On the other hand, while the rise of the Progressives created kindling, it 
is doubtful that the dramatic string of building safety reforms would have 
happened without the spark of the Triangle fire. The Progressives had an 
endless list of ways in which average citizens’ lives could be improved. 
But this is where raining flaming bodies trumped the others on the list.
The striking horror of that Saturday afternoon occurred in a sea of 
raised expectations. The outrage was strong and sustained because the 
average citizen was now less likely to accept such horrible disasters as 
simply a terrible accident, as just one more bad thing in a tough, unfor-
giving world of many inevitable bad things. A tragedy of this nature and 
dimension touched people’s hearts in a way that could not be ignored 
because it so vividly conflicted with their new feelings of hope and ex-
pectation.
The “progressive” agenda may have now run its course. Dramatically 
increasing the minimum wage hardly has the moral force of preventing 
falling flaming bodies, and may not even be good for the people it is 
trying to help. (Does it cost jobs? Does it increase the cost of living for 
low-income people?) But no matter what one may think of progressivism 
today, the original movement did play an important role in converting 
the public outrage over the Triangle Factory into practical reforms that 
have improved all of our lives.
As we shall see in other chapters, every “trigger case” has its own 
unique story, partly a product of human nature generally and partly a 
product of the social and political context of the moment.
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